Gramsci has long been held by some self-proclaiming Trotskyists as a revolutionary figure who complements Trotsky. This was always an attempt to assimilate Trotskyism to neo-Stalinism, Eurocommunism and Maoism, as currents within Euro Marxism. Today it is a more global attack on Trotsky and Lenin to boost the appeal of Menshevism when capitalism faces a terminal crisis that raises the spectre of revolution. Lukacs on the other hand, is less in favour with self-proclaiming Trotskyists because of his open capitulation to Stalin.
Yet as we will see on the most important
question of the vanguard party, Gramsci submitted to Stalinism whilst Lukacs never abandoned
his position. Lukacs was a defender of Bolshevism against Menshevism and
therefore against the influence of Gramsci in the formation of Euro Marxism. Here
we will examine Lukacs on dialectics to critique the Euro-Marxism that falls
short of a Leninist-Trotskyist standpoint.
For Lukacs
the Hungarian Revolution was an abortion. A popular front of communists with
social democrats, lacking a Leninist party, and with no successful German
revolution to back it up. Lukacs (in History…) and
his later defence of it (‘A
Defense…’) argued that it was possible that the Hungarian revolution
could have deepened as part of the European revolution, throwing out the social
democrats and arming the workers, and so on. But the vanguard party was missing
everywhere in Europe so ultimately the revolution was doomed.
Despite
his theoretical brilliance and commitment to Marxism, Lukacs’ political life fleshes
out Marx’s famous dictum that philosophers interpret the world but (in the
absence of an international vanguard party) cannot change it. His
devotion to Lenin and the Leninist Party, while second to none, didn’t survive
the degeneration of the revolution. In that sense we cannot discount the
implications of Lukacs’ capitulation to Stalinism.
Yet, the
Bolshevik revolution proved his analysis of the necessity of the proletarian
party as the class-conscious subject of history, correct, and made him the
equal of the leading Bolsheviks. Then, when that party degenerated under Stalin
into the instrument of the bureaucracy, Lukacs was again proven correct, but in
the negative. So Lukacs was with Lenin and Trotsky, that without the democratic
centralist party, organised as an international to make the revolution global, revolution
was doomed to defeat.
When Zizek
claims (in his post-face to ‘A Defence…’) that Lukacs' view of the party
was to ‘fill the gap’ (lack) between objective and subjective reality, he was incorrect.
There is a world of difference between Zizek’s voluntarist Lenin as the
messianic figure above the party who wills the revolutionary ‘event’ (act) into
being, and Lukacs’ conception of the democratic centralist party being the proletarian
‘subject’ as the class-for-itself.
If
Lukacs held onto his Leninist position on the vanguard party despite his
practical capitulation to Stalinism, Gramsci actively adapted to Stalinism on
the question of the Party and program. Gramsci covered the bureaucratisation of
the party with his theory of intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals served
the ruling class while organic intellectuals served the revolutionary class. But
in practice the party served the bureaucracy and its program therefore served
the interests of the bureaucracy.
Communist
Parties henceforth followed the line of the Third International, that in each
country the international revolution had to be subordinated to Soviet foreign
policy. The program of building socialism in one country, the SU, translated
into a two-stage theory of revolution elsewhere. Gramsci disguised the
Stalinist stage theory as a tactical question. In backward countries such as
Russia the party could mount a ‘war of maneuver’. In the advanced European
countries the necessary tactic was the ‘war of position’ – a euphemism for the
democratic revolution. In fact both
tactics were variants of the popular front between the working class and the
democratic bourgeoisie to build alliances with the SU.
In
reality Gramsci rejects Lenin and Trotsky’s view (shared by Lukacs) that the
German, Hungarian and other revolutions failed because they did not apply the
Bolshevik model of an international permanent revolution. With this theory,
Gramsci provided the theoretical cover for Menshevik stageism and the
Eurocommunist rejection of Bolshevism which was already present in the Second
International, and Kautskyism. It gave
rise to a Euro Marxism from Kautsky to Althusser and Zizek.
In fact,
Zizek’s idealist take on the subject-object split resolved by a messianic leader
such as Lenin, is a play on the Euro-Marxist tradition of Menshevik
objectivism. It takes Euro-Marxism to its anti-Marxist extreme as it accompanied
the decline and fall of Soviet world in the 1980s and 1990s. Zizek returns to
Lukacs, like Derrida returns to Marx, (see ‘St
Jacques…’) to ‘praise him’ and turn him into a post-modernist who in the end has no faith
in the proletariat to complete its historic mission but must turn to a
messianic leap of faith.
If we
trace the origins and evolution of Euro-Marxism we can easily see the influence
of Gramsci. What begins as the degeneration of the vanguard party from
democratic centralism to bureaucratic centralism is actually the programmatic
victory of Menshevism over Bolshevism. The party no longer represents the
proletariat-for-itself, but the petty bourgeois/bureaucratic
intelligentsia-for-itself.
On the
other hand, there is no doubt Lukacs follows Lenin and Trotsky on the Party and
program as overcoming one-sided objectivism and subjectivism that must be
resolved dialectically by the democratic centralist international communist
party. The Bolshevik Party, led by Lenin and Trotsky and their successors in
the ILO and the Fourth International tested theory in practice to develop
revolutionary class consciousness. While Gramsci reified the Leninist party as a
bureaucratized “intellectual” vanguard, Lukacs never changed his
view that the party was the revolutionary subject, the class-in-itself, capable
of changing objective reality.
Lukacs failure
was to capitulate to Stalin and his unreconstructed Menshevism and not to
publicly defend his conception of class-for-itself. The bureaucratic party now dictated
the consciousness of the working masses. For that crime Lukacs’ revolutionary
past was written off retrospectively as tainted by his Stalinist retreat.